Crop insurance and hedging are two risk management strategies used by farmers to manage risk. Using a discrete choice model and farm-level data, this study investigates the factors influencing farmers' use of hedging and crop insurance as risk management strategies. In the case of crop insurance, results indicate that level of education, participation in other risk management strategies (such as renting land, commodity programs, spreading sales over the year), and controlling debt are positively related to a farmer's decision to purchase crop insurance. For the hedging model, results suggest education, off-farm income, forward contracting sales of crops and livestock, and computer use are positively related to a farmer's participation in hedging/futures markets.
For an individual farmer, risk management involves finding the preferred combination of activities with uncertain outcomes and varying levels of expected return. One might say that risk management involves choosing among alternatives for reducing the effects of risk on a farm and, in doing so, affects the farm's welfare position.
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act partially removes subsidized farm programs.
1 With recent trade agreements (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and other such accords), the U.S. government is transferring to farmers more of the income risk which is driven by market forces. To manage this shift in risk, individual farmers should develop risk management strategies best suited for their farms.
Effective risk management involves anticipating outcomes and planning a strategy in advance given the likelihood and consequences of events, not just reacting to those events after they occur (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson) . Over the years, farmers have used several risk management strategies. Some risk management strategies reduce risk within the farm's operation (e.g., enterprise diversification, crop insurance, and 1 In the presence of marketing loans and subsidized crop insurance programs, the FAIR Act does not completely transfer all income risk to farmers. Additionally, as one reviewer noted, the post-FAIR policy environment resulted in more support to agriculture (through loan deficiency payments and ad hoc payments). Further, the 2002 Farm Bill restores all support programs that were in effect prior to the 1996 FAIR Act.
holding liquid reserves of cash and credit). Other strategies may focus on transferring the risks outside the business-such as hedging, forward contracting of commodities and inputs (Mishra and Perry) .
Hedging, a private risk management strategy, has been used by farmers since before the 1980s. Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry, and Somwaru note that hedging involves costs which appear modest compared with the risk-reduction benefits for most farmers. On the other hand, crop insurance, a federally subsidized program (Goodwin; Gardner and Kramer) , has become a focus for managing risk since the 1996 Farm Bill. Additionally, as pointed out by Harwood et al., crop insurance is generally more effective than hedging in reducing the risks of very low revenues. Crop insurance, first designed in 1938, has been reformed into several new products (Goodwin and Smith) .
Given the fact that hedging is a private strategy and crop insurance is a federally subsidized program, a better understanding of which farm, operator, and financial characteristics influence participation in these two risk management strategies would be useful to farm operators and managers, policy makers, insurance agencies, extension agents, and governmental agencies. An awareness of which farmers are most likely to buy crop and livestock insurance and participate in hedging/futures markets would help both risk management policy officials and insurance companies selling farm policies to better identify potential clientele.
The objective of this study is therefore to investigate the factors influencing farmers' use of hedging and crop insurance risk management strategies. The analysis includes factors suggested by previous studies and focuses on farmers' use of alternative risk management strategies, sources of information, technology, and financial viability. Our analysis is conducted on a national farm level with the unique feature of a larger sample than previously reported, comprising farms of different economic sizes and in different regions of the United States.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the section below, the empirical model is presented, with discussion highlighting a conceptual model and background information. The data are then described, followed by a presentation of the results from the crop/ livestock insurance and hedging/futures models. Next, we estimate the likelihood ratios for insuring and hedging. The article ends with a summary and concluding remarks.
The Empirical Model
Two logit models were developed. Using data on commercial sole proprietorships from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) 1994 Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS), each ith farm operator was assigned a value of 1 or 0, based on whether crop/livestock insurance or hedging/futures 2 was adopted. Binary variables resulting from the consideration of crop/livestock insurance or hedging/futures, defined as L i , were utilized in behavioral models that allow for the investigation of factors influencing their usage.
By assuming the risk management strategy preference of a farm operatorwhether to use crop/livestock insurance, or to adopt hedging/futures-is a function of exogenous variables, a representation of the underlying process of choosing from between two distinct alternatives can be described as:
2 As one reviewer correctly pointed out, a preferred method for estimating the adoption decisions of the two risk management strategies is to estimate the corresponding two equations jointly. To accomplish this, a simultaneous bivariate logit model needs to be specified and estimated. However, due to the complexity of the survey design of the 1994 ARMS and the lack of suitable computer software, implementation of such a technique was not possible.
(
Specifically, elements of the logit model (see Aldrich and Nelson; Johnston; Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lütkepohl, and Lee; Kmenta; and Hosmer and Lemeshow) are defined as follows: L i is the log-likelihood function that the ith farm operator selects a risk management strategy (i.e., crop/livestock insurance and hedging/futures); P i is the conditional probability of using a risk management strategy by the ith farm operator given X i ; X i represents a set of variables denoting farm operators' and farm characteristics; and $ $ $ $ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
Assuming the observations in the chosen sample of commercial sole proprietorships are independent, the estimated probability that the ith operator selects a risk management strategy is given as:
Model Specification
The models employed to measure the determinants of using crop/livestock insurance and those pertaining to hedging/futures can be described by rewriting equation (1) as:
Equation (3) describes a logit model which includes education and technology variables, along with six sets of variables hypothesized to influence the decision of the ith farm operator regarding his/her usage of a risk management strategy. In modeling the factors affecting the decision to buy insurance or to hedge, the study has benefitted from the work of Shapiro and Brorsen; Knight, Lovell, Rister, and Coble; Makus, Lin, Carlson, and Krebill-Prather; Goodwin and Schroeder; and Calvin. Common to all these studies is the modeling of adoption of risk management strategies in the context of a subjective expected utility framework. The underlying premise of this framework assumes farm operators seek to maximize their determined subjective utility subject to profit considerations, risk, risk preference, and other factors (Shapiro and Brorsen) .
This assumption leads to the expectation that if variables comprising the X i vector in equation (2) change in a way so as to increase expected returns, then these changes will cause an increase in the likelihood of using crop/livestock insurance or of using hedging. Similarly, any changes in the elements of X i which act to decrease the variance of returns will cause the likelihood of using any of these strategies to increase. This argument is synonymous to stating that for an individual farm operator, as the level of risk aversion increases so does the likelihood of insuring or of hedging. 
Risk:
OFF$ FARM 1 if operator works off-farm; 0 otherwise 0.24
The following six variables take the value of 1 if the corresponding strategy has been used or will be used again by the operator; 0 otherwise: 
Management:
The following two variables take values between 0 and 3, where 0 = not important and 3 = very important:
OUTDEBT Operator's attitude toward getting out of debt 2.65 LABSAV Operator's attitude toward using labor-saving equipment 2.47
Technology:
COMPBOOK 1 if operator uses computerized bookkeeping/financial analysis; 0 otherwise 0.25
Information:
The following three variables take the value of 1 if the corresponding organization has been used or will be used again by the operator as a source of information; 0 otherwise: Conducted annually by the USDA's Economic Research Service and the National Agricultural Statistics Service, the ARMS is a multi-frame stratified survey with the sample being drawn from both a list and an area frame. The survey collects data to measure the financial condition (farm income, expenses, assets, and debts) and operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural commodities, and the well-being of farm operator households.
The survey design of ARMS allows each sampled farm to represent a number of farms that are similar, the exact number of which is denoted by the survey expansion factor. This expansion factor (or weight), in turn, is defined as the inverse of the probability of the surveyed farm being selected. Consequently, these expansion factors are used to expand the data to derive estimates for the population of all farms in the United States (for technical documentation, see Morehart, Johnson, and Banker) .
Estimation of variances is more complex and requires the use of specialized computer software as in PC-CARP (Fuller, Kennedy, Schnell, Sullivan, and Park 
Results
Equation (3) was estimated using maximum-likelihood procedures in PC-CARP (Fuller et al.) , which is a statistical package suitable for analyzing data obtained with a complex survey design. Summary statistics in Table 2 show that both the crop/livestock insurance and the hedging models provided acceptable "fit" to the data.
The McFadden R 2 values of 0.32 for both models are acceptably high, particularly for logit models where evidence pertaining to this type of goodness-of-fit measure points to a range of 0.20 to 0.40 (Sonka, Hornbaker, and Hudson; Harper, Rister, Mjelde, Drees, and Way). 4 The regressions' F-statistics, which test the overall significance of the models, were significant at the 1% level. Based on a fifty-fifty classification scheme, the estimated models correctly predicted usage of crop/ livestock insurance and of hedging 82.7% and 82.1% of the time, respectively. 5 Table 2 also provides the results of tests of several hypotheses conducted in order to isolate the importance of several subgroups of coefficients within the crop/livestock insurance and hedging models.
6 Based on these results, while both the risk-related and location-related variables, as groups, appear to be important for the decision to insure and for the decision to hedge, the variables related to management and information are found to be unique to the insurance model.
The Crop/Livestock Insurance Model
From the results in Table 2 , of the 23 factors analyzed, only nine are found to be significantly correlated with the decision of the farm operator to buy crop/livestock insurance: (a) educational level of the farm operator (EDUC), (b) spreading sales over the year (SPREAD), (c) keeping unused credit capacity (CREDIT ), (d) leasing/renting of land (RENTLAND), (e) enrollment in government acreage reduction programs (GOVT ), (f ) the importance placed on getting out of debt (OUTDEBT ), (g) use of extension service/ county agent as a source of information (EXTENSION ), and (h) the geographic location of the farm being the Northeast region (NORTHEAST ), or (i) the Midwest region (MIDWEST ).
In terms of the direction of influence, with the exception of NORTHEAST, each of these factors is shown to be significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of buying crop/livestock insurance. Our finding showing the risk-related variables (SPREAD, CREDIT, LEASEM, RENTLAND, and GOVT ) are positively correlated with the likelihood of buying insurance is consistent with economic theory, since these variables reflect farm operators' higher level of risk aversion. The result pertaining to the positive association between participation in government acreage reduction programs (GOVT ) and buying insurance is consistent with that of Calvin.
While the finding of a significant and positive relationship between education and the demand for insurance is consistent with results reported by Smith and Baquet, this finding stands in conflict with what economic theory may suggest. For example, Shapiro and Brorsen allude to the possibility (based on the human capital theories developed by Welch and by Schultz) that farmers become less risk averse as they gain in experience and education-which in and of itself may suggest a decrease rather than an increase in the likelihood of adoption of riskreducing strategies.
A possible explanation for the positive linkage between education and insurance is the sample's low average of 13 years of schooling. At this low average level of education, it is conceivable that farmers with higher levels of education-and potentially lower levels of risk aversionmay continue to consider insurance, from 4 Amemiya defines the McFadden R 2 (also known as pseudo-R 2 ) as R 2 = where Ln(0) is
, the maximum of the log-likelihood function LnL($ $ $ $) subject to the constraint that all the coefficients in vector $ $ $ $ except the intercept are zero. For example, McFadden's R 2 will be 0, which indicates a poor fit, if the crop/livestock insurance model predicts operator's insurance adoption no better than a simple flip of the coin, and will be 1 if the model predicts the adoption decision perfectly.
5 Under a fifty-fifty classification scheme, the percentage of correct predictions is calculated by comparing respondent usage (lack of usage) of a risk management strategy when is at least (below) 0.50. P i 6 The importance of a given subgroup of variables to insurance or to hedging was examined by equating the coefficients of the variables within the subgroup to zero. among other alternative activities, as a viable option to manage risk. 7 Moreover, as one reviewer noted, farmers with more education have higher off-farm wages and thus spend less time on selfprotection from risk and rely more on crop insurance. Yet another explanation lies in Welch's own assertion that increased education may enhance a farmer's ability to acquire and decode information-also known as the allocative effect of education. This ability may further contribute to higher adoption rates due to a better understanding of sign-up rules and of program provisions.
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of OUTDEBT and EXTENSION suggest operators who favor getting out of debt, and those who use the Agricultural Extension Service as a source of information, are more likely to buy insurance. The positive correlation between OUTDEBT and the demand for insurance is consistent with findings by Atwood, Watts, and Baquet, who note the availability of insurance gives the operator the ability to service higher debt loads with no increase in risk. Furthermore, lenders often require highly leveraged borrowers to take out crop insurance.
To the extent the Agricultural Extension Service supplies decoded results to farmers from basic and applied research conducted at research centers and agricultural experiment stations (Huffman) , visits to extension offices by farmers tend to increase their allocative efficiency. Similar to education level, use of the extension service as a source of information appears to increase farmers' likelihood of adopting insurance as a strategy to manage risk.
Hurd observed that frequent visits to extension offices by farmers in his study contributed to the reduction in yield variance, supporting Huffman's notion of the effect such visits have on farmers' allocative efficiency. Since operators who frequent extension offices benefit from the potential decrease in their yield variance, such visits in and of themselves are in tune with farm operators' risk-aversion behavior. This may help explain why these operators, in contrast to those who do not visit extension offices, are more likely to purchase insurance. Our result is consistent with previous work by Goodwin and Schroeder; Makus et al.; and Asplund, Forster, and Stout. Financial position and size of the farm business are found to be unimportant in explaining the demand for crop/livestock insurance. Expectations may point to farms that are financially stressed wanting to insure more in fear of farm failure, and to large farms desiring more insurance due to lower costs per insured acre. However, insignificance of the coefficients pertaining to the financial position and the size of farm is attributable to the lack of variation among these variables with respect to the decision to insure.
For example, regardless of the financial solvency class or economic size of the farm business, from the sample considered in this analysis, at least two-thirds of the farms purchased crop/livestock insurance in 1994. As in Smith and Baquet, the lack of a significant positive farm size effect on the likelihood of buying insurance may be due to the large average size (over 1,200 acres) of the farms in the sample, a size large enough to allow these farms to achieve any size economies from opting to purchase insurance.
The likelihood of purchasing insurance by farms located in the Midwest (see Figure 1 for geographic regions) is found to be significantly higher than the likelihood of benchmark farms in the South. This result is not unexpected because more farms in this region than elsewhere specialize in the production of cash grains (at 54% based on 1994 ARMS data), with such specialization indicating potential for high income risk. Furthermore, the decision to purchase insurance is influenced by the expected variability in crop yields, which in turn affects the level of crop insurance premiums.
8 These findings are not surprising, since data from the 1994 ARMS show 88% of farms in the Midwest (more so than in any other region) tend to purchase crop/livestock insurance.
Farms located in the Northeast are less likely than those in the South to purchase insurance. This is because a majority (75%) of farms in the Northeast tend to produce dairy, which is a commodity characterized by low income risk. Such characterization is in line with findings by Luh and Stefanou, who concluded output price risk in dairy is not an important factor in production decision making.
The Hedging/Futures Model
Results from Table 2 show a positive relationship between the likelihood of hedging and a farmer's level of schooling.
9
A similar finding was reported by Goodwin and Schroeder, and by Makus et al., in agreement with the theoretical expectation that the efficiency of human capital production rises with an increasing stock of human capital (Ben-Porath).
The importance of education in the decision to hedge is corroborated by the result showing a positive and significant coefficient of COMPBOOK, which indicates a positive association between computer usage in bookkeeping and in financial analysis and hedging. Putler and Zilberman, for example, found education influential in the decision of the operator to own a home computer and to own a certain type of application software.
Of the seven risk-related variables considered, only the regression coefficients of OFF$FARM, CONTRACT, SPREAD, and RENTLAND are found to be significant in their relationship to hedging/futures (Table 2) . These results indicate farms whose operators work off the farm, contract or spread out the sales of commodities, and who lease/rent their land are more likely to hedge than farms whose operators do not engage in these risk management activities.
Based on data from the 1994 ARMS, commercial farm operators who use leasing/renting as a risk management strategy, in contrast to those who do not, tend to be more leveraged, as evidenced by respective debt-to-asset ratios of 0.21 and 0.13. The tendency toward higher leverage by the group of operators using the strategy of leasing/renting [i.e., nearly 95% of these operators are in fact either full tenants (15%) or partial-tenants/ partial-owners (80%)] is supported by the finding of Lines and Zulauf that the degree of indebtedness tends to increase with an increase in the level of tenancy.
Farmers with higher levels of leverage have higher probabilities of default if commodity prices decline sharply. Consequently, it is not surprising that farmers who lease/rent land are found by this and other studies (see, e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen) to be more inclined to hedge. The need to reduce price risk is what prompts many farmers to hedge. It is the need to reduce the level of yield risk and the likelihood of bankruptcy that prompts many farmers to buy crop/ livestock insurance, which may also help in explaining the positive and significant association reported earlier between RENTLAND and the demand for insurance.
Turning to the dummy variables denoting regional location (Table 2) , the coefficients of NORTHEAST and WEST are significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance, indicating farms located in either the Northeast or the West are less likely to hedge than farms located in the South.
The negative correlation shown to exist between NORTHEAST and the likelihood to hedge is not surprising. The majority of farms in the Northeastern region (about 75%) specialize in dairy production, and thus are less likely to hedge. The negative correlation between WEST and the use of hedging, however, is explained by the fact that farms in the Western region, in contrast to those in the South, tend to use an alternative method-forward contractingat a higher rate to protect against price risk. Of the farm operators in the Western region, 47.7% prefer this strategy compared to 37.1% who use hedging.
Likelihood Ratios for Insuring and Hedging
The mean probabilities of buying crop/livestock insurance and of hedging for farms with different characteristics were computed using equation (2). These probabilities, in turn, were used to calculate the likelihood ratios associated with the determinants of insuring and of hedging (Table 3) .
From the results reported in Table 3 , when the risk-related variables were considered, farm operators who worked off the farm, who contracted or spread the sales of commodities, or operated on leased/rented land were substantially more likely to hedge than those operators who did not participate in any of these risk-reducing activities.
One notable example pertains to operators who contracted the sales of their commodities. These operators were 5.7 times more likely to hedge than those operators in the omitted category. The significantly lower odds ratios found associated with these same risk-related 
Management:
OUTDEBT (attitude toward getting out of debt) LABSAV (attitude toward using labor-saving equipment) variables in the insurance model suggest risk aversion is more of an issue in hedging considerations than with insuring.
Comparison of likelihood ratios across the insurance and hedging models reveals the importance of management to farm operators who insure-via getting out of debt, and the importance of technology to those who hedge-via computerized bookkeeping.
Summary and Conclusions
Farmers have many options in managing agricultural risks, with access to various tools, such as insurance and hedging, that can help reduce their farm-level risks.
Hedging allows farmers to reduce price risk. Similarly, farmers can reduce yield risk through the purchase of crop insurance.
A logit model was developed to identify the factors influencing the likelihood of using hedging or futures and crop insurance by farm operators during the 1994 production season. This study uses national farmlevel data with great diversity regarding farm size, location, commodity produced, and other risk management strategies.
Results from the crop insurance model reveal that educational level of the operator, participation in other risk management strategies (such as renting/ leasing land, participation in commodity programs, spreading sales over the year, and keeping unused credit capacity), managing debt, and obtaining information from the extension service/county agents are positively related to a farmer's decision to purchase crop insurance. Further, farms located in the Northeast and Midwest regions of the United States are more likely to buy crop insurance.
Similar variables were found to be significant in the hedging/futures model. However, several additional variables were also significant in this model. The presence of off-farm income, forward contracting of crops and livestock, and use of computers were significant factors associated with farmers' use of hedging/futures markets. Finally, farms located in the West and Northeast regions were less likely to participate in hedging and futures markets.
Comparison of likelihood ratios across the insurance and the hedging models reveals the importance of management (via getting out of debt) to farm operators who insure, and the importance of technology (via computerized bookkeeping) to those who hedge.
In summary, the findings of this study should enhance the understanding of risk management issues by those involved with advising farmers and policy makers on the implementation of effective risk management strategies. In addition, educators, extension agents, and other information multipliers can use information on those factors found to have a positive influence on managing risk to better tailor their educational and training programs to the specific needs of their clientele.
